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The SARG04 protocol is one of the most frequently used protocol in commercial plug-and-play quantum
key distribution (QKD) system, where an eavesdropper can completely control or change the photon number
statistics of the QKD source. To ensure the security of SARG04 protocol in plug-and-play QKD system with an
unknown and untrusted source, the bounds of a few statistical parameters of the source need to be monitored. An
active or a passive source monitor schemes are proposed to verify these parameters. Furthermore, the practical
issues due to statistical fluctuation and detection noise in the source monitoring process are quantitatively ana-
lyzed. Our simulation results show that the passive scheme can be efficiently applied to plug-and-play system
with SARG04 protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a means of shar-
ing a secret key between two parties (Alice and Bob) in
the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). The single-photon
(e.g. BB84 [1] and SARG04 [2]), entanglement-based (e.g.
E91 [3]) and continuous variable (e.g. GG02 [4]) QKD pro-
tocols have proved to be unconditionally secure under ideal
(source, channel, detection and postprocessing) assumptions
[5–12]. In practical QKD systems, the security assumptions
are not completely satisfied and security loopholes exist [13].
Real implementations of QKD may deviate from the ideal
models in security proofs, such as laser with intensity fluc-
tuation [14, 15], detectors with mismatched detection effi-
ciency [16–21], or detection blinding [22–24]. The uncon-
ditional security of practical QKD systems will be compro-
mised if these loopholes are not included in general security
analysis or no counter measures are made. For instance, the
ideal security proof for the BB84 protocol was given when a
single-photon source was assumed [6], while highly attenu-
ated laser source is often used in real experiment, where the
source sometimes produces multi-photon states. Due to the
channel loss and these multi-photon states, Eve can perform
the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [25]. Lately, more
general security analysis for the BB84 protocol with weak
coherent laser source and semi-realistic models were given
[7, 8]. Furthermore, several methods (such as decoy state [26–
32] and SARG04 [2] protocols) have been proposed to fight
against the multi-photon loophole.
The security loophole considered in this paper is the un-
trusted source problem [33–43]. In the standard security
analysis of some protocols (such as BB84, decoy state, and
SARG04 protocols), the photon number distribution (PND)
of the QKD source is assumed to be fixed and known to Alice
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and Bob, which is defined as a trusted source. However, in a
one-way QKD system, the intensity fluctuation from the laser
source and the parameter fluctuation from the optical devices
cause the assumption of the trusted source to fail [14, 15, 42].
More seriously in a two-way plug-and-play QKD system, Eve
can even control or change the PND of the QKD source in
principle, such that the source is unknown and untrusted [35].
To solve the untrusted source problem, the statistical charac-
teristics of the QKD source need to be monitored in real ex-
periment [36]. Many theoretical researches have been done on
the security analysis for BB84 and decoy state protocols with
an untrusted source [35, 37–41, 43], and the real-time source
monitoring for both one-way and two-way systems have been
demonstrated experimentally [36, 37, 42].
As is pointed out in [5], the SARG04 protocol is more ro-
bust than BB84 against the PNS attack, and has been applied
in commercial plug-and-play QKD system [44]. However,
this protocol also suffer from the untrusted-source problem.
In this paper, rigorous security analysis for the SARG04 pro-
tocol with an untrusted source is given, and the lower bound
of secure key rate is devised if the ranges of a few statistical
parameters of the untrusted source are known. Then, an active
and a passive schemes are proposed to monitor these param-
eters. Furthermore, the practical issues of finite data size and
detection noise are quantitatively analyzed.
II. SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR THE SARG04 PROTOCOL
WITH AN UNTRUSTED SOURCE
The security key rate of the SARG04 protocol is [9]
R = −Qµ f (Eµ)H2(Eµ) + Q1[1 − H2(Z1|X1)]
+Q2[1 − H2(Z2|X2)], (1)
where Qµ and Eµ are the total count rate and quantum bit error
rate (QBER) respectively, Q1(2) is the gain of the 1(2)-photon
state, Z1(2) and X1(2) are random variables characterizing the
phase and bit errors for the 1(2)-photon state respectively, f (x)
2is the error correction efficiency, and H2(x) = −x log2(x)−(1−
x) log2(1− x) is the Shannon entropy function. Suppose pX1(2)
denote the probability that bit flip without phase flip occurs on
1(2)-photon state, pZ1(2) denote the probability that phase flip
without bit flip occurs on 1(2)-photon state, and pY1(2) denote
the probability that both bit flip and phase flip occur on 1(2)-
photon state. Let ei (epi) denote the bit (phase) error rate for
i-photon state, and e1(2) = pX1(2)+pY1(2), ep1(2) = pZ1(2)+pY1(2).
It has been proved for one-way postprocessing that [9],
pX1 = e1 − a, pZ1 =
3
2
e1 − a, pY1 = a,
pX2 = e2 − b, pZ2 ≤ xe2 + g(x) − b, pY2 = b, (2)
where g(x) = [3 − 2x + (6 − 6√2x + 4x2)1/2]/6, and e1/2 ≤
a ≤ e1, 0 ≤ b ≤ e2. Based on Eq. (2), one has H2(Z1|X1) ≤
Hmax2 (Z1|X1), where Hmax2 (Z1|X1) = −H2(e1)−e1 log2(e21)−(1−
2e1) log2(1 − 2e1), and H2(Z2|X2) ≤ H2(Z2) ≤ H2(eoptp2 ), where
e
opt
p2 = maxx
{xe2 + g(x)}. Then,
R ≥ −Qµ f (Eµ)H2(Eµ) + Q1[1 − Hmax2 (Z1|X1)]
+Q2[1 − H2(eoptp2 )]. (3)
In order to calculate the final secure key rate, one needs a good
estimation of Q1(2) and e1(2). There are a few methods to ap-
proach the target. One is proposed by GLLP [8], where all
the losses and errors are assumed from the 1-photon and 2-
photon states, and Q1(2) and e1(2) are overestimated. Another
is the decoy state method [26–32], which can accurately esti-
mate the parameters. Here, we consider the SARG04 protocol
combined with decoy state method.
A fundamental assumption in the decoy state protocol with
a trusted source is en = esn = edn and Yn = Y sn = Ydn [26],
where Yn is the yield of n-photon state and the superscript
s(d) means the signal (decoy) source. The optimal estimation,
with applying infinite decoy states, converges to [9],
Yn = ηn(edet2 +
1
4
) + 1
2
(1 − ηn)Y0,
en = [ηn
edet
2
+
1
4
(1 − ηn)Y0]/Yn, (4)
where ηn is the probability for n-photon state to arrive at Bob’s
detector, Y0 is the dark count rate of Bob’s detector, and edet
is the probability that a photon hit the erroneous detector in
Bob’s side. Then, one has Q1(2) = P1(2)Y1(2), where P1(2) is the
probability for Alice to send out 1(2)-photon state that is fixed
and known to Alice and Bob with a trusted source.
In the untrusted source case, the assumptions of esn = edn
and Y sn = Ydn are broken [34, 35], and the results in Eq. (4)
no longer hold. One needs new methods to estimate Q1(2),
which has been an open question. Fortunately, the results
in [35, 39] provide two new ways to estimate the lower bound
of Q1 for BB84 protocol combined with 3-intensity decoy
state methods. However, in SARG04 protocol, both 1-photon
and 2-photon states have positive contributions to the secure
key rate. Thus, the main task for the SARG04 protocol with
an untrusted source is to derive the lower bound of Q2. We
find a modification of the method in [39] will approach this
task. In the following, the lower bound of Q2 is calculated for
the SARG04 protocol combined with 4-intensity decoy state
method in untrusted source scheme.
In a SARG04 protocol combined with 4-intensity decoy
state method, Alice randomly sends four kinds of sources:
vacuum, decoy-1, decoy-2 and signal source, with probabil-
ity p0, p1, p2, and p′, respectively. In the trusted source
scheme, the source is controlled completely by Alice, and
the quantum states of vacuum, decoy-1, decoy-2 and signal
sources are expected to be ρ0 = |0〉 〈0|, ρ1 =
∑∞
n=0 an |n〉 〈n|,
ρ2 =
∑∞
n=0 bn |n〉 〈n| and ρs =
∑∞
n=0 a
′
n |n〉 〈n|, respectively,
where {a′n, an, bn} are fixed and known. In the untrusted
source scheme, the source is controlled and prepared by Eve
(as shown in Fig. 1(a)), and {a′n, an, bn} are unknown.
Suppose Alice sends M optical pulses to Bob totally. In
a real experiment, one could observe the following parame-
ters: Ns, Nd1(2), and N0 (the number of counts caused by sig-
nal, decoy-1(2), and vacuum sources, respectively). Then the
count rates for signal, decoy-1(2), and vacuum sources are
Qµ = Ns/p′M, Qd1(2) = Nd1(2)/p1(2)M, and Y0 = N0/p0M,
respectively. Denote the lower (upper) bound of {a′n, an, bn}
as {a′nL(U) , aL(U)n , bL(U)n }. One can rigorously prove that (see
Appendix A for details)
Q1 ≥
a′2
LQµ − aU2 Qd1 − (a′2LaU0 − a′0LaU2 )Y0
a′2
LaU1 − a′1LaU2
(5)
under condition
a′k
L
aUk
≥ a
′
2
L
aU2
≥ a
′
1
L
aU1
, (for all k ≥ 3), (6)
and
Q2 ≥
a′3
LQd1 − aU3 Qµ − (a′3LaU0 − a′0LaU3 )Y0 − (a′3LaU1 − a′1LaU3 )
Qd2−bL0 Y0
bL1
c(a′3LaU2 − a′2LaU3 )
(7)
under conditions
a′k
L
aUk
≥ a
′
3
L
aU3
≥ a
′
2
L
aU2
≥ a
′
1
L
aU1
, (for all k ≥ 4), (8)
and
c = 1 +
aU3 a
′
1
L − a′3LaU1
a′3
LaU2 − aU3 a′2L
bL2
bL1
> 0. (9)
3When one consider the contribution from only 1-photon
state for the SARG04 protocol, the final secure key rate is
R1photon ≥ −Qµ f (Eµ)H2(Eµ) + Q1[1 − Hmax2 (Z1|X1)]. (10)
The parameters {a′0L, aU0 , a′1L, aU1 , a′2L, aU2 } need to be verified
to estimate the gain of 1-photon state in Eq. (5), after which
one has e1 ≤ EµQµ/Q1. Then one can calculate the secure key
rate as Eq. (10). This case is defined as Case-1. When one
consider the contributions from both 1-photon and 2-photon
states, the parameters {a′0L, bL0 , aU0 , a′1L, bL1 , aU1 , a′2L, bL2 , aU2 ,
a′3
L
, aU3 } need to be verified to estimate the gains of 1-photon
and 2-photon states as in Eqs. (5) and (7). Then one can nu-
merically choose the optimal values e1 and e2 under constrain
QµEµ ≥ Q1e1 + Q2e2 to lower bound the secure key rate in
Eq. (3). This case is defined as Case-2. Note that the condi-
tions in Eq. (6) for case-1 and in Eqs. (8) and (9) for case-2
need to be verified experimentally. In the following, we pro-
pose an active and a passive source monitors to estimate these
statistical parameters experimentally.
III. ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SOURCE MONITORS
The schematic diagram of a QKD system with an untrusted
source is shown in Fig. 1(a), where the source is assumed to be
completely controlled and prepared by Eve. A source monitor
is used to verify the statistical characteristics of the untrusted
source in Alice’s side. At least two schemes can realize the
source monitor: an active scheme shown in Fig. 1(b) [35],
and a passive scheme shown in Fig. 1(c) [36–38]. Suppose
that P1(n) is the PND of the untrusted source at P1 (Pi means
position i in Fig. 1), and P3(m, η) is the PND at P3 given that
the attenuation coefficient of the VOA is η. Then one has [36]
P3(m, η) =
∑∞
n=m
P1(n)
(
n
m
)
η′m(1 − η′)n−m, (11)
where η′ = η for active scheme and η′ = η × ηBS for passive
scheme. Due to the definition of {a′m, am, bm},
a′m = P3(m, ηs), am = P3(m, ηd1), bm = P3(m, ηd2). (12)
A full security analysis procedure can be divided in to four
steps. Step1: Estimate the bounded statistical parameters
of the untrusted source based on the experimental measure-
ment results. Step2: Verify the conditions shown in Eqs. (8)
and (9). Step3: Calculate the lower bound of Q1 and Q2 based
on Eqs. (5) and (7). Step4: Estimate the final secure key rate.
A. Active Source Monitor
In the active source monitor shown in Fig. 1(b), one half
of the optical pulses are randomly sent to a photon-number-
resolving (PNR) detector for parameters estimation, and the
other half are sent to Bob for key generation [35]. For simpli-
fication, the PNR detector is assumed to be noiseless and the
detection efficiency is 1. Clearly,
D(m, η) = P3(m, η), (m = 0, 1, 2, 3, · · · ), (13)
FIG. 1: (Color online) (a) Schematic diagram of the QKD system
with an untrusted source. The untrusted source prepared at P1 by
Eve, where Pi means position i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), passes through an
optical filter, a phase randomizer (PR), an encoder and a variable op-
tical attenuator (VOA) with attenuation coefficient η = ηs, ηd1, ηd2,
and 0, for the signal, decoy-1, decoy-2, and vacuum source, respec-
tively. Then, the source is sent into a source monitor at P2 to esti-
mate the statistical parameters for security analysis, and sent out of
Alice’s side at P3. (b) Schematic diagram of an active source mon-
itor. A high-speed active optical-switch (OS) randomly sends one
half of the input optical pulses to a photon-number-resolving (PNR)
detector at P4 for parameter estimation, and sends the other half to
Bob for key generation. (c) Schematic diagram of a passive source
monitor. The optical pulses are passively separated into two parts
by a beam-splitter (BS) with transmittance ηBS : one goes to a PNR
detector with efficiency ηD at P5, which is modeled by an attenua-
tor with efficiency ηD combined with an ideal PNR detector, and the
other is sent out of the source monitor.
where D(m, η) is the probability that m photoelectrons are
recorded by the PNR detector given that the attenuation co-
efficient of the VOA is η. Combining the results in Eqs. (12)
and (13), a′m = D(m, ηs), am = D(m, ηd1), bm = D(m, ηd2).
Clearly, one can bound of parameters {a′m, am, bm} based on
the recorded data D(m, η). Then one can verify the conditions
in Eqs. (6), (8), and (9), and calculate the final secure key rate.
B. Passive Source Monitor
As pointed out in [36, 37], it is challenging and inefficient
to implement the active scheme. Then, a practical passive
scheme is proposed and tested experimentally [36]. In the
passive source monitor shown in Fig. 1(c), optical pulses are
separated into two parts by a beam splitter (BS) with transmit-
tance ηBS : one goes to a PNR detector with efficiency ηD, and
the other is sent out of Alice’s side. For simplification, one set
(1 − ηBS )ηD = ηBS . (14)
Then the PND at P3 is the same to that at P5,
P5(m, η) = P3(m, η). (15)
If the PNR detector is noiseless, the detected photoelectron
distribution F(m, η) at P5 will be the same to P5(m, η),
F(m, η) = P5(m, η). (16)
4Based on Eqs. (12), (15) and (16), one can bound the pa-
rameters {a′m, am, bm} with the knowledge of F(m, η). In a real
system, one needs to consider the practical imperfections of
the source monitor. In the following, the effects of statistical
fluctuation and detection noise are quantitatively analyzed.
1. Infinite Data Size and Noiseless Source Monitor
Suppose that M is the total number of optical pulses sent
from Alice to Bob, while p′M(= Ms), p1M(= M1), and
p2M = (M2) is the number of signal, decoy-1, and decoy-2
pulses, correspondingly.
Step1. When the data size M → ∞, one has a′mL = a′mU =
F(m, ηs), aLm = aUm = F(m, ηd1), bLm = bUm = F(m, ηd2).
Step2. The conditions in Eqs. (8) and (9) turn to
F(k, ηs)
F(k, ηd1) ≥
F(3, ηs)
F(3, ηd1) ≥
F(2, ηs)
F(2, ηd1) ≥
F(1, ηs)
F(1, ηd1) (k ≥ 4),
1 + F(3, ηd1)F(1, ηs) − F(1, ηd1)F(3, ηs)
F(2, ηd1)F(3, ηs) − F(3, ηd1)F(2, ηs)
F(2, ηd2)
F(2, ηd1) > 0.
Step3. In case-1, the gain of 1-photon state is calculated by
Eq. (5) based on the recorded data F(m, η), and all the errors
are assumed from 1-photon state e1 = EµQµ/Q1. In case-2,
the gains of 1-photon and 2-photon states are calculated by
Eqs. (5) and (7) based on the recorded data F(m, η), and e1(2)
are chosen numerically to lower bound the secure key rate.
Step4. Calculate the secure key rate for case-1 and case-2
with Eqs. (10) and (3), respectively.
For testing the efficiency of the passive scheme, the sim-
ulation results for the trusted source are compared with that
for the untrusted source (shown in Fig. 2), while the data size
is infinite. The PND for the trusted and the untrusted source
is assumed to be of Poissonian statistics to perform simula-
tions. The error correction efficiency f (Eµ) = 1.22. The
transmittance ηBS of the BS is 0.13 and the detection effi-
ciency ηD of the PNR detector is 0.15. The other experi-
mental parameters are cited from the GYS experiment [45]
as shown in Table I, where ηBob is the efficiency of Bob’s
detection, e0 is the probability that a dark count hit the er-
roneous detector in Bob’s side. Suppose the average photon
number (APN) for signal, decoy-1 and decoy-2 sources are
µ, v1 and v2, respectively. The conditions in Eqs. (8) and (9)
turn to e
−µµk
e−v1 v1k
≥ e−µµ3
e−v1 v13
≥ e−µµ2
e−v1 v12
≥ e−µµ
e−v1 v1
for all k ≥ 4, and
1 − v2
v1
v1+µ
µ
> 0. As shown in Fig. 2, the performance of
the untrusted source based on the passive source monitor is
very close to that of the trusted source, and the 2-photon state
makes positive contribution to the secure key rate.
TABLE I: The simulation parameters for Figs. 2-5.
ηD ηBS ηBob α Y0 edet e0
0.15 0.13 0.045 0.21 1.7 × 10−6 3.3% 0.5
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Simulation results of the SARG04 protocol
for the trusted source, compared with the untrusted source in both
case-1 and case-2 when the data size is infinite. In the trusted source
case, infinite decoy state method is used to estimate the values of
Q1, Q2, e1, e2 as in Eq. (4). The top (red) line is the simulation results
for the trusted source, where one considers the contribution from
both 1-photon and 2-photon states. The second (yellow) line is the
simulation results for the untrusted source in case-2. The third (blue)
line is the simulation results for the trusted source, where one con-
siders the contribution from only 1-photon state. The bottom (green)
line is the simulation results for the untrusted source in case-1. In
all the simulations, the PND for both trusted and untrusted source is
assumed to be of Poissonian statistics.
2. Finite Data Size and Noiseless Source Monitor
Suppose that the data size M is finite. Let jsm, jd1m , and jd2m
denote the number of detected signal, decoy-1 and decoy-2
pulses at P5 given the PNR detector records m photoelectrons.
Step1. The APN of signal source is µ ∼ O(10−1) while
the APN of decoy-1 source is v1 ∼ O(10−2). When the data
size is finite (e.g. M = 1012), one may always observe that
jd1m = 0 for all m > J while jd1J > 0 (e.g. J = 10) in a real
experiment, which infers that the counts caused by the photon
number states m > J in decoy-1 source can be ignored in the
experiment. For instance, given that the PND of the decoy-1
source is Poissonian with an APN v1 = 0.01, the probabil-
ity that the decoy-1 source sends out photon number states
n > 10 is less than 10−25, which can be ignored for data size
M = 1012. To estimate Q1 and Q2, and verify the conditions
in Eqs. (6), (8), and (9), one only needs to bound the param-
eters {a′mL, aUm , bLn } for m = 0, 1, · · · , J and n = 0, 1, 2 with
finite data size (see Appendix B). Using the random sampling
theory [46], each F(m, ηs) ∈ [ jsm/Ms − ε′, jsm/Ms + ε′] with
a confidence level 1 − 2 exp(−Msε′2/2) for signal pulses, and
each F(m, η1(2)) ∈ [ jd1(2)m /M1(2) −ε1(2), jd1(2)m /M1(2)+ε1(2)] with
a confidence level 1 − 2 exp(−M1(2)ε21(2)/2) for decoy-1(2)
pulses can be estimated. Simultaneously, F(m, ηs) ∈ [ jsm/Ms−
ε′, jsm/Ms + ε′], F(m, η1) ∈ [ jd1m /M1 − ε1, jd1m /M1 + ε1] for m =
0, 1, 2, · · · , J, and F(n, η2) ∈ [ jd2n /M2−ε2, jd2n /M2+ε2] for n =
0, 1, 2 are approximately estimated with a confidence level
α = 1 − 2(J + 1) exp(−Msε′2/2) − 2(J + 1) exp(−M1ε12/2) −
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Simulation results for the SARG04 protocol
with an untrusted source in case-1 and case-2 with data size M, based
on the passive source monitor. The PND of the untrusted source is
assumed to be Poissonian. The other experimental parameters are
cited from Table I. (a) Simulation results in case-2 with data size
M = ∞, 1012, 1011, 1010, 109, respectively. (b) Simulation results in
case-1 with data size M = ∞, 1012, 1011, 1010, 109, respectively. The
confidence level is set to be 1 − 10−6.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Comparison between case-1 and case-2 for the
SARG04 protocol with an untrusted source: (a) with data size M =
1012; (b) with data size M = 1011. The PND of the untrusted source
is assumed to be Poissonian. The other experimental parameters are
cited from Table I. The confidence level is set to be 1 − 10−6.
6 exp(−M2ε22/2). From Eqs. (12) and (16), one gets
a′m
L
=
ksm
Ms
− ε′, aUm =
kd1m
M1
+ ε1, bLn =
kd2n
M2
− ε2,
for m = 0, 1, 2, · · · , J and n = 0, 1, 2 with confidence level α.
Step2. It is challenging to verify directly the condition
in Eq. (8) with finite data size: a) In hardware, the PNR de-
tector is required to discriminate the photon number n =
0, 1, · · · ,∞; b) When the photoelectron number m is large
enough, one always gets ksm = kd1m = 0. One needs a rea-
sonable cutoff value of m. Suppose jd1m = 0 for all m > J
while jd1J > 0. To lower bound the gains of Q1 and Q2 with
finite data size, one can replace the condition in Eq. (8) as
a′k
L
aUk
≥ a
′
3
L
aU3
≥ a
′
2
L
aU2
≥ a
′
1
L
aU1
, (for all 4 ≤ k ≤ J), (17)
where the PNR detector is only required to discriminate pho-
ton number n = 0, 1, · · · , J (see Appendix B for details). The
condition in Eq. (9) turns to
1 + F(3, ηd1)F(1, ηs) − F(1, ηd1)F(3, ηs)
F(2, ηd1)F(3, ηs) − F(3, ηd1)F(2, ηs)
F(2, ηd2)
F(2, ηd1) > 0. (18)
Step3. If the conditions in step2 are satisfied, one can lower
bound the parameters Q1 and Q2.
Step4. Calculate the secure key rate for case-1 and case-2
with Eqs. (10) and (3), respectively.
For testing the effects of finite data size, we choose an un-
trusted source of Poissonian statistics to perform simulations
in both case-1 and case-2. The error correction efficiency
f (Eµ) are chosen to be 1.22. The other experimental param-
eters are cited from Table I. Simulation results for case-2 and
case-1 are shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b), and the data size are set
to be M = ∞, 1012, 1011, 1010 and 109, respectively. To com-
pare the two cases more clearly, Fig. 4 shows the simulation
results for case-1 and case-2 with M = 1012 and 1011, respec-
tively. In all the above simulations, the confidence level is set
to be α = 1 − 10−6. The simulation results show that statisti-
cal fluctuation has negative effect on performance of the QKD
system. When the data size is large enough, the 2-photon state
has positive contribution to the secure key rate.
3. Finite Data Size and Source Monitor with Random Additive
Detection Noise
Given a PNR detector with an independent additive detec-
tion noise y, the detected photoelectron number m′, and the
photon number m at P5 satisfy m′ = m + y. One can calculate
the lower and upper bound of PND P5(m, η) at P5 based on
the photoelectron distribution F(m, η) with a high confidence
level, given that the distribution of the detection noise N(y) is
known by Alice.
The dark count is the main kind of detection noise for the
PNR detector such as time multiplexing detector (TMD) [48,
49], transition-edge sensor (TES) [50], or a threshold detector
together with a VOA [51]. In case of independent Poisson
6statistics noise, the probability of detecting m′ photoelectrons
is F(m′, η) = ∑m′d=0 N(y = m′ − d)P5(d, η) where N(y = d) =
e−λλd/d! is the probability that d dark counts occur in the PNR
detector, and λ is the average dark-count rate. Then, one has

P5(0, η)
P5(1, η)
P5(2, η)
P5(3, η)
 =

F(0, η) 0 0 0
F(1, η) F(0, η) 0 0
F(2, η) F(1, η) F(0, η) 0
F(3, η) F(2, η) F(1, η) F(0, η)


eλ
−λeλ
λ2eλ/2
−λ3eλ/6
 .
Step1. Using random sampling theory [46], simultane-
ously, F(m, ηs) ∈ [ jsm/Ms − ε′, jsm/Ms + ε′], F(m, ηd1) ∈
[ jd1m /M1 − ε1, jd1m /M1 + ε1], and F(m, ηd2) ∈ [ jd2n /M2 −
ε2, jd2n /M2 + ε2] for m = 0, 1, 2, · · · , J and n = 0, 1, 2 are es-
timated with a confidence level 1 − 2(J + 1) exp(−Msε′2/2) −
2(J + 1) exp(−M1ε12/2)− 6 exp(−M2ε22/2). Then, one yields
a0 ≤ eλ(
jd1
m=0
M1
+ ε′),
b0 ≥ eλ(
jd2
m=0
M2
− ε2),
a′0 ≥ eλ(
js
m=0
Ms
− ε′),
a1 ≤ eλ(
jd1
m=1
M1
+ ε1) − λeλ(
jd1
m=0
M1
− ε1),
b1 ≥ eλ(
jd2
m=1
M2
− ε2) − λeλ(
jd2
m=0
M2
+ ε2),
a′1 ≥ eλ(
js
m=1
Ms
− ε′) − λeλ( j
s
m=0
Ms
+ ε′),
a2 ≤ eλ(
jd1
m=2
M1
+ ε1) − λeλ(
jd1
m=1
M1
− ε1) + λ
2
2
eλ( j
d1
m=0
M1
+ ε1),
b2 ≥ eλ(
jd2
m=2
M2
− ε2) − λeλ(
jd2
m=1
M2
+ ε2) + λ
2
2
eλ( j
d2
m=0
M2
− ε2),
a′2 ≥ eλ(
js
m=2
Ms
− ε′) − λeλ( j
s
m=1
Ms
+ ε′) + λ
2
2
eλ( j
s
m=0
Ms
− ε′),
a3 ≤ eλ(
jd1
m=3
M1
+ ε1) − λeλ(
jd1
m=2
M1
− ε1) + λ
2
2
eλ( j
d1
m=1
M1
+ ε1)
−λ
2
2
eλ( j
d1
m=0
M1
− ε1),
a′3 ≥ eλ(
js
m=3
Ms
− ε′) − λeλ( j
s
m=2
Ms
+ ε′) + λ
2
2
eλ( j
s
m=1
Ms
− ε′)
−λ
2
2 e
λ( j
s
m=0
Ms
+ ε′).
Our analysis is not limited to the Poissonian noise case. Gen-
erally, when the random-positive detection noise y with dis-
tribution N(y) is known to Alice, one can still use the same
method in [43] to estimate the parameters {a′0L, bL0 , aU0 , a′1L,
bL1 , aU1 , a
′
2
L
, bL2 , aU2 , a
′
3
L
, aU3 } with a certain confidence level.
Step2. Using the same method, one can estimate the bound
values {a′kL, aUk } for 4 ≤ k ≤ J, and verify the conditions in
Eqs. (9) and (17). Since the expressions of {a′kL, aUk } for 4 ≤
k ≤ J are much complex and trivial, we assume the above
conditions are satisfied as in [36, 40].
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Simulation results for the SARG04 protocol
with an untrusted source based on the passive scheme: (a) with finite
data size M = 1012, and the average dark count rate of the Poisso-
nian detection noise λ = 0, 10−6, 0.5, and 1, respectively, in case-2;
(b) with finite data size M = 1012, and the average dark count rate of
the Poissonian detection noise λ = 0, 10−6, 1, 1.5, and 2, respectively,
in case-1. The PND of the untrusted source and the distribution of de-
tection noise are assumed to be Poissonian. The other experimental
parameters are cited from Table I. The confidence level is 1 − 10−6.
Step3. Lower bound the parameters Q1 and Q2.
Step4. Calculate the secure key rate for case-1 and case-2
with Eqs. (10) and (3), respectively.
For testing the effect of dark count noise, the simulation
results for case-2 are shown in Fig. 5(a), with finite data size
M = 1012 and average dark count rate λ = 0, 10−6, 0.5, and
1, respectively. The simulation results for case-1 are shown
in Fig. 5(b) with M = 1012 and λ = 0, 10−6, 1, 1.5 and 2,
respectively. The confidence level is set to be α = 1 − 10−6.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION REMARK
In summary, we have shown the unconditional security of
the SARG04 protocol with an untrusted source, given that
the bound of some key statistical parameters of the untrusted
source are known by Alice and Bob. The analytical expression
for the lower bound of the gain of 2-photon state is derived.
Furthermore, an active and a passive source monitors are pro-
posed to verify these parameters experimentally. Finally, we
analyze the effects of the practical imperfections in the passive
source monitor quantitatively, such as finite data size and ad-
ditive detection noise. Asymptotically, the performance of the
QKD system with an untrusted source combined with passive
source monitor is very close to that of a trusted source. Our
7results can be directly applied to plug-and-play QKD system
with SARG04 protocol.
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Appendix A: Lower bound of Q1 and Q2 for SARG04 Protocol
with an untrusted source
Suppose Alice sends M pulses to Bob in the whole quan-
tum process. At any time i, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , M},
Alice randomly produces vacuum (|0〉 〈0|), decoy-1 (ρ1i =∑∞
n=0 ani |n〉 〈n|), decoy-2 (ρ2i =
∑∞
n=0 bni |n〉 〈n|), and signal
(ρsi = ∑∞n=0 a′ni |n〉 〈n|) source with the probability p0, p1, p2,
and p′, respectively, where {ani, bni, a′ni} are controlled and
prepared by Eve. Following the methods in [39, 40], some
definitions are necessary for further analysis. Definition 1. In
the protocol, Alice sends M pulses, and Bob gets M observa-
tions. If Bob’s detector click at time i, we say that “the ith
pulse from Alice has caused a count”. Definition 2. Sets C
and cn: Set C contains any pulse that has caused a count; set
cn contains any n-photon pulse that has caused a count. Defi-
nition 3. Denote the lower (upper) bound of {a′
ni, ani, bni} as
{a′nL(U) , aL(U)n , bL(U)n } for i = 1, 2, · · · , M.
Define dki = 1p1aki+p2bki+p′a′ki and Dk =
∑
i∈ck dki. If the ith
pulse contains zero photon, the probability that it comes from
the vacuum source is Pvi|0 = p0d0i. Therefore, the number
of counts caused by vacuum source is N0 =
∑
i∈c0 pvi|0 =∑
i∈c0 p0d0i. Similarly, if the ith pulse contains zero photon,
the probability that it comes from the decoy-1, decoy-2 and
signal source are P1i|0 = p1a0id0i, P2i|0 = p2b0id0i, and
Psi|0 = p′a′0id0i, respectively. Then the number of counts
caused by zero photon state in decoy-1, decoy-2 and signal
source are n0d1 =
∑
i∈c0 p1a0id0i, n0d2 =
∑
i∈c0 p2b0id0i, and
n0s =
∑
i∈c0 p
′a′0id0i, respectively. It is clear that
nU0d1 =
p1aU0 N0
p0
≥ n0d1 ≥
p1aL0 N0
p0
= nL0d1,
nU0d2 =
p2bU0 N0
p0
≥ n0d2 ≥
p2bL0 N0
p0
= nL0d2, (A1)
nU0s =
p′a′0
U N0
p0
≥ n0s ≥
p′a′0
LN0
p0
= nL0s.
The main result in [39] is to derive the lower bound of D1
based on 3-intensity decoy state method (which can be seen
as a special case of the 4-intensity decoy state method p2 = 0
in this paper),
D1 ≥ DL1 =
a′2
L
p1
Nd1 − a
U
2
p′ NS −
a′2
L
p1
nU0d1 +
aU2
p′ n
L
0s
a′2
LaU1 − aU2 a′1L
, (A2)
under condition a
′
k
L
aUk
≥ a
′
2
L
aU2
≥ a
′
1
L
aU1
for all k ≥ 3. Further, one
can lower bound the gain of 1-photon state in signal source,
Q1 = p′ ∑
i∈c1
a′1id1i
1
p′M ≥
a′1
LDL1
M as shown in Eq. (5). In the
following, the lower bound of Q2 is derived. The number of
counts caused by decoy-1(2) and signal sources are
Nd1 = n0d1 + p1
∑
i∈c1
a1id1i + p1
∑
i∈c2
a2id2i + p1
∞∑
k=3
∑
i∈ck
akidki,
Nd2 = n0d2 + p2
∑
i∈c1
b1id1i + p2
∑
i∈c2
b2id2i + p2
∞∑
k=3
∑
i∈ck
bkidki,
Ns = n0s + p′
∑
i∈c1
a′1id1i + p′
∑
i∈c2
a′2id2i + p′
∞∑
k=3
∑
i∈ck
a′kidki,
(A3)
which can be rewritten as
Nd1 = n0d1 + p1aU1 D1 + p1a
U
2 D2 + p1Λ1 − ξ1, (A4)
Nd2 = n0d2 + p2bL1 D1 + p2b
L
2 D2 + p2Λ2 + ξ2, (A5)
Ns = n0s + p′a′1
LD1 + p′a′2
LD2 + p′Λ′ + ξ3, (A6)
where Λ1 =
∑∞
k=3 a
U
k Dk, Λ2 =
∑∞
k=3 bLk Dk, Λ′ =
∑∞
k=3 a
′
k
LDk,
and ξ1 ≥ 0, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ3 ≥ 0. Define
ξ = Λ′ − a′3L/aU3 Λ1,
and assume a
′
k
L
aUk
≥ a
′
3
L
aU3
≥ a
′
2
L
aU2
≥ a
′
1
L
aU1
for all k ≥ 4, which leads
to ξ ≥ 0, one has
Ns = n0s + p′a′1
LD1 + p′a′2
LD2 + p′
a′3
L
a3U
Λ1 + p′ξ + ξ3. (A7)
Combining Eqs. (A4) and (A7), one has
D2 =
a′3
L
p1
Nd1 − a
U
3
p′ Ns −
a′3
L
p1
n0d1 +
aU3
p′ n0s + (aU3 a′1L − a′3LaU1 )D1 +
a′3
L
p1
ξ1 +
aU3
p′ (ξ3 + p′ξ)
a′3
LaU2 − aU3 a′2L
.
Since ξ1, ξ3 and ξ are all non-negative, a′3
LaU2 − aU3 a′2L ≥ 0 and a′3LaU1 − aU3 a′1L ≥ 0, one has
D2 ≥
a′3
L
p1 Nd1 −
aU3
p′ NS −
a′3
L
p1 n
U
0d1 +
aU3
p′ n
L
0s + (aU3 a′1L − a′3LaU1 )DU1
a′3
LaU2 − aU3 a′2L
.
(A8)
8It is clear that Nd2 ≥ nL0d2 + p2bL1 D1 + p2bL2 D2. Then one has
D1 ≤
Nd2 − nL0d2
p2bL1
− b
L
2
bL1
D2 = DU1 . (A9)
Combine the results of Eqs. (A8) and (A9), one has
DL2 =
a′3
L
p1
Nd1 − a
U
3
p′ NS −
a′3
L
p1
nU0d1 +
aU3
p′ n
L
0s + (aU3 a′1L − a′3LaU1 )
Nd2−nL0d2
p2bL1
c(a′3LaU2 − aU3 a′2L)
,
(A10)
under conditions a
′
k
L
aUk
≥ a
′
3
L
aU3
≥ a
′
2
L
aU2
≥ a
′
1
L
aU1
for all k ≥ 4 and
c = 1+ a
U
3 a
′
1
L−a′3 LaU1
a′3
LaU2 −aU3 a′2 L
bL2
bL1
> 0. Further, one can estimate the lower
bound of gain of 2-photon state in signal source Q2 ≥ a
′
2
LDL2
M
as shown in Eq. (7).
Appendix B: Verify the condition in Equation (8) in finite data
size
Suppose that one observe jd1m = 0 for all m > J while jd1J >
0, and jsm = 0 for all m > J′ while jsJ′ > 0 (J′ ≥ J) in a real
experiment. Similar to Eqs. (A3),
Qd1 =
J∑
k=0
Qd1k +
∞∑
k=J+1
Qd1k ,
where Qd1 = Nd1/M1 is the count rates of the decoy-1 source,
and Qd1k = p1
∑
i∈ck akidki/M1 is the gain of k-photon state in
decoy-1 source, which can be explained as the probability that
Alice produces a k-photon pulse in decoy-1 source and the
pulse causes a count at Bob’s detectors. Clearly, Qd1k ≤ ak and
Qd1 ≤ ∑Jk=0 Qd1k +∑∞k=J+1 ak, which infers,
Nd1 ≤ n0d1 + p1
J∑
k=1
∑
i∈ck
akidki + M1PJ ,
where PJ =
∑∞
k=J+1 ak. Using the Clopper-Pearson confidence
interval theory [47], one can upper bound PJ with a confi-
dence level 1 − α, where (1 − PUJ )M1 = α/2 and PUJ ∼ 1M1 is
the upper bound of PJ. Similar to Eqs. (A3), one has
N′d1 ≤ n0d1 + p1
∑
i∈c1
a1id1i + p1
∑
i∈c2
a2id2i + p1
J∑
k=3
∑
i∈ck
akidki,
Ns ≥ n0s + p′
∑
i∈c1
a′1id1i + p
′
∑
i∈c2
a′2id2i + p
′
J∑
k=3
∑
i∈ck
a′kidki,
where N′d1 = Nd1 − M1PUJ . Then one can calculate the lower
bounds of D1 and D2 can be expressed the same as Eqs. (A2)
and (A10) except replacing the Nd1 by N′d1, and the condition
in Eq. (8) can be replaced by
a′k
L
aUk
≥ a
′
3
L
aU3
≥ a
′
2
L
aU2
≥ a
′
1
L
aU1
, (for all 4 ≤ k ≤ J).
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